But horizontally (that is, geographically) it is likely a recipe for strategic shrinkage. An EU focused on developing the instruments needed to become a more complete geopolitical actor in its own region – a task which will require a sizeable hard-power component due to Russia’s willingness to use force in pursuing its perceived interests despite the economic costs – may become stronger in a vertical sense. In surveying the EU’s strategic environment, much detail and attention were given to the EU’s wider neighbourhood, with comparatively less to the increasingly important ‘Indo-Pacific’ theatre. The adoption of the EU’s Strategic Compass provides some indications. The first is whether the EU will see itself primarily as a global or regional actor. Their emergence out of France and Germany’s shadow on issues of foreign and security policy may not be easily undone and will shape the answers to two major questions that the EU will face after the war in Ukraine ends. No longer seen as part of the problem in impeding an EU-Russia rapprochement, these countries are currently playing a major role in shaping the EU’s priorities on the Ukraine file. What can already be clearly observed, however, is the growing relative legitimisation of the foreign policy perspectives of the EU’s newer members. In short, EU unity is neither complete nor a panacea, whereas steps forward on defence – while trending in a positive direction – remain a work in progress. A more agile and even more strategically sovereign EU does not necessarily equate to a shift in global polarity. In any event, it is unlikely that Brussels alone could be a player on a par with Washington and Beijing on many policy files (except perhaps climate change) and in every geographical theatre. Implementation of the defence integration provisions outlined in the Strategic Compass would also be noteworthy for the EU, but the proof will remain in the pudding. And while its battlefield losses in Ukraine have been sobering, in some respects throwing its ‘great power status’ into doubt, it will plainly retain a large stake in the European security system that cannot be ignored. At present, Russia does not fully align with the Western interpretation of those concepts – and perhaps it never will – yet it remains geographically in Europe. After the Cold War, membership of the European family has been predicated on being a liberal democratic nation-state and market economy. Unity is also not a substitute for providing a substantive answer to the question of what to do about Russia’s place in Europe, which will remain germane even in the event of a decisive Ukrainian military victory. The special pleading from Hungary is therefore difficult to understand on objective grounds, revealing more deep-seated divisions among the EU-27 than a passing divergence of interests. Moreover, in an integrated EU market it should not matter where a country receives its energy from, as it should be able to count on supply from its partners. Russia tries to sell its oil and gas at world market prices: contrary to popular conception, Russian energy is not much cheaper than imports from elsewhere. Some Member State objections to stricter energy sanctions, on display at the recent special meeting of the European Council, are more political than economic.
In any event, identifying shared threats and reacting decisively in a crisis are not the same as fostering a common understanding of European interests or developing an EU grand strategy.
The unprecedented level of sanctions adopted are certainly notable, although this cohesion has already begun to fray. The days when a plethora of European voices emphasised understanding and strategic empathy towards Russia’s declared security concerns are unlikely to return for the foreseeable future. Putin’s war has undoubtedly consolidated EU elite opinion along anti-Russia lines. It neglects a third and perhaps equally consequential dynamic, namely the (at least temporary) increased influence of the EU’s eastern members.
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Now you can format math beautifully! Most of learning LaTeX from now is memorizing the code for certain objects ( \object), since you now know the foundational structure of LaTeX.Contrasting with its exclusion from the diplomatic high table prior to the war, the exercise of Russian aggression has allegedly strengthened the EU in two fashions: enhancing unity between its Member States and prompting capitals to take matters of security and defence more seriously.
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